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NOTES
spent apart from the abandoned spouse might properly be count-
ed even though Mr. Hurry had "sped to court."'" The court must
have thought that some halt must be called in the rush for
divorces and is certainly not to be criticized for acting conscien-
tiously in a matter of such vital concern to the commonwealth.
However, present conditions would indicate to the writer at
least that this attempt to stem the tide has been and will be a
deterrent of no value and should be abandoned. As a social policy
the matter should be left to the time when the legislature may
restate the law of divorce as, a whole.
HARRIET S. DAGGETT*
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE - THEATER PROPRIETORS - DUTY OF
COURTEOUS TREATMENT-Plaintiff, accompanied by his wife, pre-
sented tickets for admission to defendant's theater. An attend-
ant refused to admit him on the ground that plaintiff was a
cripple and that his presence during crowded hours involved a
hazard to his safety. The refusal was apparently made in the
presence only of the attendants and plaintiff's' wife. Held, on
appeal to the supreme court, that plaintiff is entitled to damages
for emotional disturbances arising out of breach of contract.
Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Incorporated, 22 So.(2d) 189 (La.
1945).
Emotional disturbance is not usually recognized as an inde-
pendent actionable wrong. However, the general rule that there
can be no recovery without physical injury is cloudedwith excep-
tions. The exceptions created by the courts involve actions
where the defendant has wilfully violated some right which
the court recognizes. If a technical battery,' a trespass, 2 an inva-
sion of the right of privacy, a case of false imprisonment4 or
15. Hurry v. Hurry, 141 La. 954, 76 So. 160 (1917).
* Professor of Civil Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Spearman v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 164 La. 677, 114 So. 591
(1927); William Small & Co. v. Lonergan, 81 Kan. 48, 105 Pac. 27 (1909);
Davidson v. Lee, 139 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Bowdoin, 168 S.W. 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
2. Matheson v. American Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 137 S.C. 227, 135 S.E.
306 (1926).
3. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927); Rhodes v. Graham,
238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.(2d) 46 (1931).
4. Shannon v. Sims, 146 Ala. 673, 40 So. 574 (1906); Ross v. Kohler, 163
Ky. 583, 174 S.W. 36 (1915); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Radford, 36 Okla.
657, 129 Pac. 834 (1913).
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wrongful eviction' can be made out, the court is willing to
attach parasitic damages for mental suffering. Often the ortho-
dox wrong exists only in the most technical sense, and the sub-
stantial hurt is the ensuing mental anguish. For their failure to
accord the interest in emotional security a direct and full protec-
tion the courts have offered several explanations.'
Breach of contract offers another peg upon which courts
frequently hang mental suffering damages. Although the dam-
ages might arise as a consequence of the breach itself, in most
cases it is the insolent conduct accompanying the breach that
gives rise to mental anguish." Thus in cases involving a common
carrier of passengers the courts commonly speak in terms of
an implied contract to accord passengers courteous treatment,
and allow recovery for insult by an attendant" or abuse by other
passengers.9 In other cases where the contractual relation is
equally clear the court will ignore it and allow recovery by
referring directly to the public duty owed the passenger.10 From
the very nature of the business the carrier is in a peculiar position
to inflict this injury, and courts are prone to allow recovery
without serious regard to a choice of theories.1 '
The carrier offers a striking analogy to the theater operator. 12
The similarities are obvious. Both deal with the public en masse.
5. Dirmeyer v. O'Hern, 39 La. Ann. 961, 3 So. 132 (1887); Sandlin v. Coyle,
143 La. 121, 78 So. 261 (1918); Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580 (1878).
6. Courts in some instances say the damages are too remote. Mental
suffering is often termed too vague and easily simulated, too difficult to
estimate, or recovery would open up a flood of litigation. Perhaps the best
explanation is historical. In the modern age the feelings have come to be
recognized as an important element of the personality and the increased com-
plexities of life have caused plaintiffs to press this interest. In at least one
case this has been noted. In Summerfield v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87
Wis. 1, 11, 57' N.W. 973, 975 (1894), the court said: "If, in the evolution of
society and the law, this innovation should be deemed necessary, the legis-
lature can be safely trusted to introduce it, with those limitations and safe-
guards which will be absolutely necessary, judging from the variety of cases
that have sprung up since the promulgation of the Texas case."
7. Enders v. Skannal, 35 La. Ann. 1000 (1883). The plaintiff was driven
from land on which he had contracted to cut timber. Court said it was not
only a breach of contract, but a breach in such a way as to constitute an
offense under the laws and allowed recovery for outrage to plaintiff's feelings.
8. Bleecker v. Colorado & S. Ry. Co., 50 Colo. 140, 114 Pac. 481 (1911);
Knoxville Traction Co. v. Lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899).
9. Birmingham R. Light & P. Co. v. Glenn, 179 Ala. 263, 60 So. 111 (1912).
10. May v. Shreveport Traction Co., 127 La. 420, 53 So. 671 (1910); Haile
v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 135 La. 229, 65 So. 225 (1914); Lipman v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 108 S.C. 151, 93 S.E. 714 (1917).
11. In Texas & P. R.R. Co. v. Jones, 39 S.W. 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897),
the passenger had not yet purchased his ticket and recovery for Insulting
conduct was allowed. The court was satisfied to find that plaintiff was one
who intended to become a passenger.
12. Aaron v, Ward, 203 N.Y. 351, 96 N.E. 736 (1911). The Louisiana court
has often suggested the analogy in cases involving physical injuries to
NOTES
Neither could operate without the congregating of large masses
of people for the common purpose of transportation or amuse-
ment. In both instances there is an assumption, of a high degree
of care by the defendant, who occupies a superior position to
patron or passenger, and the duty of civil treatment may well be
said to be the same in all cases.18
However, several courts have rejected the carrier analogy
in dealing with the proprietor of places of amusement and have
denied damages to a patron who was excluded from a public
theater.14 The reason assigned is that the theater is a private
business governed by such rules as the management makes,
while the carrier operates under a franchise, obligated to take
anyone desiring to become a passenger.
In the present case the court emphasized the breach of con-
tract or revocation of license,"5 relying principally on Lewis v.
Holmes 6 for supporting authority. In the latter case the plaintiff
had contracted for delivery of a wedding trousseau and the dam-
ages suffered came from the failure to receive the wedding dress.
The plaintiff did not get what she bargained for, and the mental
suffering ensuing from the breach could reasonably have been
anticipated by the defendant. 7 O'Meallie v. Moreau," also relied
on by the court, represents another case where the loss of bargain
gave rise to mental suffering. The plaintiff in that action recov-
ered for the disappointment, annoyance, vexation, and mortifica-
tion caused by breach of a contract to furnish a picnic park for
a long advertised outing of a social club. The court could readily
appreciate the obvious disappointment of the victims in these
theater patrons. Lonatro v. Palace Theater Co., 5 La. App. 386 (1927);
Bentz v. Saenger-Ehrlich Enterprises, Inc., 197 So. 659 (La. App. 1940);
Welcek v. Saenger Theatres Corp., 5 So.(2d) 577 (La. App. 1942).
13. See Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, 119 S. W. 195 (Ky. App. 1909); Boswell
v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn. 35, 185 S.W. 692 (1916).
14. Luxenburg v. Keith & Proctor Amusement Co., 117 N.Y. Supp. 979, 64
Misc. 69 (1909); Buenzle v. Newport Amusement Ass'n, 29 R.I. 23, 68 Atl.
721 (1908).
15. It is the almost 'universal holding that a theater ticket is a mere
license, revocable at the will of the proprietor. Marrone v. Washington
Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633, 33 S.Ct. 401, 57 L.Ed. 679 (1913). Louisiana, how-
ever, seems to hold that the manager must have good reason to believe one
is creating a disturbance before he is privileged to revoke the license. Russo
v. Orpheum Theatre & Realty Co., 136 La. 24, 66 So. 385 (1914); Planchard v.
Klaw & Erlanger New Orleans Theatres Co., 166 La. 235, 117 So. 132 (1928).
16. 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903).
17. In Garner v. Burnstein, 1 La. App. 19 (1924), the court denied recovery
because the defendant did not have notice that the hat which plaintiff ordered
was for a special occasion and distinguished the Holmes case. The court
was careful, however, to point out that plaintiff had probably been injured.
18. 116 La. 1020, 41 So. 243 (1906).
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cases, and the circumstances left little doubt as to the substantial
nature of the resulting injury to the sensibilities. Loss of bargain
sometimes offers a tangible basis upon which to estimate the
damages of mental suffering. In the instant case, however, it is
obvious the plaintiff was not suing for loss of the advantage of
witnessing the performance. His claim was for discourteous
treatment.
Although most courts prefer to seize upon the breach of' con-
tract idea or the public duty owed by the carrier or proprietor,
several cases have proceeded more directly to the point. The
courts in such cases often resort to such terms as "improper
expulsion," 19 or "wrongful acts ' 20 or "wanton or shamefully gross
wrong, 12 1 offering no clue as to what is improper or wrongful. In
one Louisiana case 22 similar to the present controversy, recovery
was allowed without reference to any theory whatsoever. These
decisions, although difficult to align with established torts doc-
trines, indicate nevertheless that here is an independent wrong
which is on the way to achieving open recognition. Few decisions
in the history of torts law have directly announced the advent on
first trial of a complete new doctrine with boundaries fully
defined. Usually the process is one of slow and cautious growth.
Hence vagueness and uncertainty in these opinions is to be
expected.
In conclusion it might be questioned whether the plaintiff
in the instant case sustained any appreciable injury. The de-
defendant was seeking to enforce a rule for the safety of his
patrons, and the reported evidence that his conduct was excessive
was meagre at best. The law cannot effectively protect overacute
sensibilities without disregard of the hard actualities of modern
living. On the facts as given it may be suggested that the court
has overshot the mark.
JOHN C. MORRIS, JR.
PARENT AND CHILD-LIABILITY OF PARENT FOR MISUSE OF AIR
RIFLE BY CHILD-DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES-Defendant's son,
a boy of about ten years of age, fired at a target with an air rifle
which he had borrowed from a friend. The shot ricocheted and
19. Aaron v. Ward, 203 N.Y. 351, 96 N.E. 736 (1911).
20. Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 Pac. 209 (1904).
21. Saenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938).
22. Planchard v. Klaw & Erlanger New Orleans Theatres Co., 166 La. 235,
117 So. 132 (1928).
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